Risk of Travel-Associated Tuberculosis
- Hans L. Rieder
- Tuberculosis Division, International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, Kirchlindach, Switzerland
- Reprints or correspondence: Dr. Hans L. Rieder, Tuberculosis Division, International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease,
Jetzikofenstr. 12, 3038 Kirchlindach, Switzerland (TBRieder{at}cs.com).
Abstract
Infection with Mycobacterium tuberculosis might be acquired at home or during travel. The risk is determined by exposure frequency to a source case and the duration
of the exposure. Thus, whether travel increases the background risk depends on origin, destination, and duration of travel.
Infection might be acquired indoors or outdoors, but the overall risk seems small, whatever the setting. Bacille Calmette-Guérin
vaccination and preventive therapy have both been discussed as possible preventive interventions, but the disadvantages associated
with both approaches appear to outweigh any benefits. Because the risk of acquisition of infection with M. tuberculosis is small, the most rational approach is likely to delay intervention until a traveler presents with clinically active tuberculosis,
as is done with any other patient.
The risk of becoming infected with Mycobacterium tuberculosis depends on 2 factors: first, relevant exposure to a source of infection, and second, the probability of becoming infected
if there is exposure. Exposure risk is determined by the epidemiologic profile of tuberculosis in the population segment within
which one preferentially moves. Tuberculosis incidence varies not only among [1] but also within countries [2].
Indoors, tubercle bacilli are expelled into a finite volume of air unless there is ventilation [3]. Furthermore, they may remain viable and suspended in the air for a prolonged period of time. Inside exposure is rare, but
if it happens, exposure time and density of infectious droplet nuclei are often, respectively, prolonged and high.
In contrast, tubercle bacilli outdoors are rapidly dispersed and rendered quickly nonviable by sunlight or even sky light
[4]. Outside exposure is usually brief and by chance, and the distance between the source and the exposed makes the risk of
transmission very small during a single encounter. However, it might be a relatively common event, depending on the population
characteristics and the setting. Most simply put, the risk of becoming infected is the result of the density of infectious
droplet nuclei in the available air and the duration of inhalation of that air. Confined air systems with no or poorly filtered
air exchanges pose the major risk for indoor transmission, be it at home [5], on a ship [6, 7], on a train [8], in an office building [9], or in a health care institution [10].
These 2 types of exposure risks coexist and determine the resulting prevalence of infection with M. tuberculosis in a population. Therefore, cumulative probability of becoming infected in a lifetime is determined by the risk of infection
in both closed and nonclosed settings, and the importance of each contributor will vary in different settings [11]. These general principles of transmission also apply to the risk of acquiring infection with M. tuberculosis during travel.
Indoor Transmission During Travel
A high level of attention has been given to transmission during air travel [12]. However, epidemiologically, the overall public health importance of such events must be very small, for several reasons.
The prevalence of transmissible tuberculosis in the air travel population might be in the order of 5–100 cases per 100,000
passengers, depending on the route of the plane. Considering the average number of people on an airplane, there is perhaps
1 encounter per 3–60 flights.
Should exposure to a potential transmitter of M. tuberculosis on a plane nevertheless occur, the ventilation system on modern airplanes will prevent tubercle bacilli from random distribution
aboard it, because the laminar flow assures that air entering overhead leaves the cabin near the floor at approximately the
same seat row. Furthermore, the efficient ventilation system rapidly dilutes the density of infectious particles [12]. Most important, the exposure time to such air is, by necessity, very limited by the duration of the flight. The example
of transmission from a flight attendant to other cabin personnel is instructive in that way [13]. A flight attendant with undiagnosed cavitary tuberculosis exposed and infected several coworkers. Given the constraint
of movement for cabin personnel, exposure was probably physically so close that it outpaced the ventilation system. Still,
⩾10 h were required to measure an appreciable elevation of the prevalence of infection with M. tuberculosis above the expected background prevalence. Most such events are likely to go unnoticed. Even where such incidents became known
in well-conducted epidemiologic investigations, transmission from passenger to passenger has, as expected, only rarely been
documented [12, 14, 15]. Air travel is both individually and from a public health point of view a negligible risk factor for transmission of M. tuberculosis. However, precisely because such casual encounters will only rarely become known, these few specific reports also point out
that they do quite logically occur, albeit with a low frequency, and that each single one of which carries a very low (but
distinct) risk that may accumulate over a lifetime.
Outdoor Transmission During Travel
The risk among long-term travelers is a different matter. Transmission during travel usually requires repeated, but brief,
casual exposure outdoors. In a population-based study, the risk of acquiring infection with M. tuberculosis was measured among low-budget, long-term travelers from The Netherlands who largely visited Africa, Asia, and Latin America
[16]. The study essentially confirmed that the risk of acquiring infection with M. tuberculosis among these travelers was essentially the same as that estimated for the general population in the host countries—that is,
an annual risk of infection with M. tuberculosis of 1%–3% [17].
Thus, the risk of infection with M. tuberculosis increased from ∼10 latent infections per 100,000 person-years in The Netherlands to an incidence of ∼2000 latent infections
per 100,000 person-years during travel, an impressive relative risk but still a modest absolute risk. In the Dutch study,
it was not unexpected that the risk of infection for health care workers with direct patient contact was 3-fold larger than
that for other travelers [16].
Options For Interventions
What should long-term travelers be told, like those in The Netherlands who traveled for a median of approximately one-half
of a year [16]?
Prophylactic treatment (prevention of infection). There is some limited evidence that prophylactic treatment (i.e., treatment to reduce the risk for acquisition of infection
with M. tuberculosis in case of exposure) works at least partially [18]. The simplest and best-tolerated long-term prophylactic treatment is isoniazid taken daily. However, the doubtful efficacy
of prophylactic treatment, the rarity of acquisition of infection with M. tuberculosis, and the potential adverse drug events from isoniazid all make this intervention an unappealing proposition.
BCG vaccination. Protection from BCG vaccination against potentially lethal forms of infant tuberculosis is predictably high in virtually
every setting [19]. However, for the age group of young adults in question, only 1 prospectively conducted study of adolescents in the United
Kingdom has provided a reasonably high level of protection (80%) in the 10–15 years after vaccination [20]. The evidence for advocating routine BCG vaccination for long-term travelers from an industrialized country to a higher
incidence country is simply too weak.
Tuberculin skin testing and preventive therapy of latent infection. Alternatively, one might consider pre- and posttravel tuberculin testing coupled accordingly with preventive therapy. Two
issues must be considered here: the operating characteristics of the tuberculin skin test and effectiveness of preventive
therapy.
Tuberculin skin testing is a remarkably weak diagnostic tool by present-day standards, and it is fraught with problems both
in application and interpretation [21]. The test must be given and read in 2 separate sessions, and it must be performed by skilled personnel, to reduce the risk
of testing and reading errors. The correct balance between sensitivity (inclusion of the infected) and specificity (exclusion
of the noninfected) is not easily found. The problem is compounded with pre- and posttravel tuberculin testing, because repeated
testing may lead to a boosted response in persons with preexisting mycobacterial infection and to larger tuberculin skin test
reaction sizes, which falsely suggest the recent acquisition of infection. To reduce this risk, the administration of a second
pretravel tuberculin skin test, to be taken as a baseline value, is proposed [22]. This approach increases the specificity of the test, but at a cost. It requires a total of 3 tuberculin tests and 5 consultations
with a health care provider who is familiar with the test intricacies. Such a procedure is cumbersome, expensive, and still
leaves some uncertainty in the interpretation [23, 24] of a posttravel tuberculin skin test result. But if these procedures are not followed, the risk of treating too many uninfected
persons increases unnecessarily. The only alternative to increase the test specificity would be to markedly increase the criterion
to declare a tuberculin test as indicative for infection with M. tuberculosis, an approach that correspondingly sacrifices sensitivity [25].
Thus, a limited specificity of the tuberculin skin test must generally be accepted. However, among a population of 700,000
17–21-year-old Navy recruits who were lifetime residents in the United Sates and who were enrolled in a study from 1961 through
1968, the impact on the predictive value of a positive tuberculin test result was clearly demonstrated. In this Navy recruit
population, the estimated prevalence of infection with M. tuberculosis was close to 2% [26]. It is probably fair to state that there is no particular reason to believe that the background prevalence of infection
with M. tuberculosis is much higher than this in today's population of lifetime residents of the same age in, for example, Canada, the United
States, and western Europe. A skin test induration size of ⩾10 mm predicted in that scenario the true presence of infection
with M. tuberculosis in just 16% among persons without a specific history of a known exposure to tuberculosis [26]. Even if a long-term traveler like those in The Netherlands accumulates an additional 1% risk to this background during
travel, the predictive value of a test subsequent to travel improves only marginally.
Under the assumption that the problems with the operating characteristics of the test have been overcome, the effectiveness
of preventive therapy needs to be addressed. Simply put, effectiveness is the product of regimen efficacy, risk of tuberculosis
given infection, and adherence to the recommended regimen. For example, if the efficacy of 12 months of isoniazid that is
faithfully taken is 90% [27], the cumulative risk of progression from subclinical infection to clinically overt pulmonary tuberculosis in a young adult
is ∼15% [28], and if adherence to the prescribed regimen is 50% [29], then the overall effectiveness is ∼7%, which does not yet take into account a loss from follow-up between pre- and posttesting
of 40% reported in the Dutch study [16]. In other words, to prevent a single case of infection, 14 other persons are inefficiently and often unnecessarily treated
and exposed to the risk—albeit a small one [30]—of adverse drug reactions to isoniazid.
The American Thoracic Society limits its recommendations for targeted tuberculin skin test screening for recent infection
(the potential in the group of travelers) to persons recognized as having a high risk of having acquired recent infection.
These include, notably, contacts of known infectious cases [25]. Persons who are immigrants from countries with high prevalence that travelers may visit are recommended for screening because
of the expected high prevalence of infection after a lifetime risk of increased exposure, as opposed to the relatively short
exposure time of most travelers. Thus, a universal strategy of tuberculin testing and preventive therapy in travelers cannot
be advocated for both economic and epidemiologic reasons. Even if it is advocated [22], this recommendation is unlikely to be heeded by widespread acceptance. These considerations show that there is no satisfying
direct intervention among travelers to prevent the ultimate risk of clinically manifest tuberculosis.
Intervention only in the case of active tuberculosis. Is it thus time to admit to failure in identifying an effective preventive intervention against travel-associated tuberculosis?
The only remaining alternative is to await the rare case of development of clinically overt travel-associated tuberculosis
[16] and then treat it appropriately. This approach may be unsatisfying, but after rational reflection about the multitude of
problems associated with all preventive interventions, it remains probably both the wisest and also most cost-effective proposition.
- Received March 9, 2001.
- Revision received May 8, 2001.
- © 2001 by the Infectious Diseases Society of America